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sketch a crude model of indexical constructions in general. Let us take it that indexical
terms always
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involve a demonstrative element ( this , that , or perhaps simply pointing) plus a
descriptive element ( animal , shape , car ). The compound indexical term ( that
animal ) then refers to the unique entity, if there is one such, that both lies in the
direction indicated by the demonstrative element and satisfies the descriptive term.
Some indexical phrases run together both demonstrative and descriptive components
( now = this time , there = that place ), but this terminological fact does not affect the
underlying model.
We can think of the descriptive element in an indexical construction as fixing some range
of possible referents, and the demonstrative element plus the contents of the indicated
direction as then narrowing down this range to some specific referent. Note that it is
consistent with this model that indexical constructions just like phenomenal concepts
and other general concepts can be used to refer to both types and particulars. The
phrase that car can be used to pick out either a model (the Rolls-Royce Corniche, say)
or some specific car (Tom Jones's Roller). The disambiguation here can be done
explicitly ( that make of car ) or left to the conversational context.
Let me now return to phenomenal concepts themselves. The suggestion to be examined is
that Mary's distinctive new powers of reference lie solely in the fact that she is now in a
position to demonstrate past experiential items of her own, where previously she could
not. On this suggestion, the formation of phenomenal concepts owes nothing to acts of
imaginative re-creation or introspective classification, but simply to the availability of
past instances of the experience in question.
The sharpest way of showing that this suggestion does not work is to consider the kind of
case where Mary uses a phenomenal concept to think about red experiences (the type, let
us suppose, for the sake of specificity) after her original red experience is over. As I have
been representing this case, Mary re-enacts her original experience in imagination, and
therewith thinks about that experience. According to the suggestion under examination,
however, the imaginative re-creation plays no essential role. Mary is simply
demonstrating the relevant experiential type in question by pointing back in time to one
of her own experiences.
But suppose that Mary has forgotten when and where she had this earlier experience, and
has no other identifying information about it, and so cannot demonstrate it using standard
indexical constructions. This won't stop her being able to refer to that type of experience
as this experience , accompanied by some act of imagination. She will still be able to
think thoughts like I'd love to have this experience again, even though I can't for the life
of me remember when or where I previously had it .
Exactly how the this here interacts with the act of imaginative re-creation will be
explored further in Chapter 4. For the moment my concern is only to establish that the
imaginative act plays an essential role. Mary isn't simply pointing back in time to the
occasion where she first had that kind of experience; she is somehow using her new
power of imagination to pick out that kind.
It may seem as if the model I am disputing will work better when we turn to cases where
thinkers refer to experiences they are currently undergoing. As I have been representing
this kind of case, the thinker performs an act of introspective classification, and therewith
thinks about the experience in question. But why suppose the act of introspective
classification plays any essential role here? When I look into myself, and refer to some
aspect of my experience as this feeling , am I not simply pointing internally to
something occurring inside me?
But even here there are difficulties. It seems unlikely that the indexical construction this
feeling is ever well directed enough to identify some specific aspect of an individual's
overall conscious experience. At any time an individual's conscious experience will be
multi-faceted and multi-modal. You can see many different features and objects at a
given time, not to mention further awareness involving hearing, smelling, itching, and so
on. Given this, you will need something more than a simple this feeling , pointed
generally inside yourself, so to speak, to determine which aspect of your current
experience is being referred to.
This is where I take introspective classification to play an essential role. It serves to
highlight some specific aspect of your current
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experience, and thereby to render your phenomenal concept this experience
determinate. Without any such introspective classification, there would be nothing to fix
which of the many features of your overall experiential state is being referred to. Simply
pointing inwards to your current manifold experience could not possibly constitute a
referential act, without introspective classification to focus reference on some specific
feature.12
Again, there is more to be said about the way in which introspective classification enters
into phenomenal concepts, and I shall return to this in Chapter 4. For the present I want
only to establish that introspective classification plays some such role.
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